Funding tactics

With ~$1.50 CAC returning $4-5 per customer (about $4 per $1 within 8 days), he planned a bank line of credit as a cushion until Apple payouts arrived, and ended up using an interest-free credit card, spending as much as he could while the math held. Because golf is seasonal, he pushed hard in July and August, then turned ads off at the end of the season.

Customers rent devices on 24- or 36-month contracts paid monthly with no early exit (e.g. ~EUR 50/month for a laptop). Fleet resells each contract to a bank, which pays the full contract value upfront minus ~10%. Fleet buys the device with that cash and books its margin on day one; the bank carries the credit risk if the client goes bankrupt. At contract end Fleet buys the device back from the bank for a small amount. Because growth needs no working capital, the company was cash-flow positive and bootstrapped for 7 years.

In the Feb 2026 LBO (~EUR 100M valuation, investor took ~25%, all money secondary), every employee could sell 100% of their equity, including those staying. Investors usually want stayers to roll ~half into the next cycle; Fleet refused that as unfair and instead created a new 5% ESOP pool for the next cycle. The founders now tell candidates 'your equity is real money' and that a liquidity event within 5 years is near-certain.

Previously used Stripe loans repaid as a percentage of every dollar collected; with fast growth they repaid in ~3 months, making the effective interest very high. Switched to Founderpath: $450K, ~16-month term, fixed ~$35K/month so cash flow is plannable. Money goes to scaling outside sales (covering the gap when top reps are promoted, Indeed recruiting, market ramp), not ads. Founder frames cost of capital vs. equity dilution as the key comparison.

After walking away from a VC term sheet, and with ~10,000 users on the app, ran an equity crowdfunding round on Seedrs (now Republic). Before going live, agreed terms and valuation with a handful of pre-identified angels (2-3 put in six figures each per round); everyone else invests on the same terms, no preferred shares, from as little as ~10. Made a pitch video plus docs and financials; publicly stated what the money would fund. Gave perks: all first-round investors got a Savvy Navvy sailing jacket; another round gave 3-year subscriptions. Set a minimum (enough for the next 12-18 months) and a maximum (to cap dilution) and closed the round when the max was hit. Used the money mainly for B2C marketing. Later taps the 2,500 investors (mostly boaters) for expertise, e.g. logistics or marketing advice. Investors can sell on the platform's secondary market.

Rather than paying cash, take a loan for the purchase price. Illustration: an app making $10K/month profit bought for $350K on a 10-year loan with ~$5K/month payments leaves ~$5K/month profit; price is earned back in ~3 years with 7 more years of loan term. Only buy apps with organic distribution built in, so profit doesn't depend on continued ad spend. Used for Indie App Santa (2024) even though they had the cash.

Flew to San Francisco and stacked nine investor meetings into 2 days. Every investor knew she was only in town for 2 days to meet investors, so each knew that if they didn't move, someone else would. Her rule: don't start fundraising until you can create competition for the deal and have the meetings back-to-back; investors show growth signal (a lot of growth in a short time), not a magic number, and without a competing offer they keep asking for more data and drag things out.

When buying an app, pay 50% at closing and guarantee the remaining 50% after 12 months regardless of KPIs or app performance. Unlike an earnout (payment tied to e.g. keeping downloads at current levels), payout isn't tied to performance, which sellers see as fair, and the lower upfront risk lets the buyer offer a higher valuation. Alternatives discussed: all-cash, earnout, equity plus cash (e.g. 70/30), revenue share.

Measured early UGC returns (ROAS / LTV:CAC ~5-6x, with a constant view-to-download rate per format), then emptied his bank account and took a ~$100K personal loan to pay creators. Scaled at break-even (every dollar in came back out) and reinvested all revenue into growth.

Hired contractors on Upwork early: one dev at 40 hours/week, the rest a couple of hours per week each, covering email sequences, SEO, ad management, design, Webflow, and a ~$5/hour support/generalist person. Paid for it from his tech salary, took no pay himself, and ran the business in the red for his last year at Opendoor to fund growth experiments. Reasoning: his time was worth ~$150/hour, contractors ~$50/hour and more expert. First dev hire was terrible; the second was good and helped vet later hires.

Set the quit line at the point the business covers all personal expenses without burning savings or cutting contractors: ~$20K/month revenue = ~$10K/month profit (New York cost of living). Decided to leave at ~$17-18K/month and gave notice for December; laid off in November with severance. Worked nights and weekends meanwhile, with a 'Ship It Sundays' friend group chat.

Decided validation meant ~$20K, enough to fund about 3 months of his life building. Divided by his target price point for this customer type to get 50 buyers, then used expected conversion rates to estimate how big the email list needed to be before launching the presale.